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Introduction
Harry Collins is internationally recognized as a distinguished sociologist of sci-
ence who writes creatively on a substantial number of varied subjects. He
is acknowledged as one of the prominent specialists on the topic of tacit
knowledge and has played an important role in the introduction of this topic
into science studies. He has investigated the topic extensively, most famously
through several case studies of physics [Collins 1974, 1984, 1985, 1990, 2001a,b,
2004], [Collins & Kusch 1995, 1998], [Collins & Pinch 1993], [Pinch, Collins
& Carbone 1996]. The publication of his latest book, Tacit and Explicit
Knowledge ([Collins 2010], hereafter TEK), provides the occasion and pri-
mary motivation for the present thematic issue of Philosophia Scientiæ. The
aim of this issue is to discuss Collins’s new ideas on tacit knowledge developed
in TEK, and more generally to address issues related to the tacit dimension,
especially (but not exclusively) in science.
The point of departure for this thematic issue was a conference in December
2011, entitled “Tacit Knowledge in Science: Discussions with Harry Collins”,
which was organized by the PratiScienS team, in Nancy, France.1 Harry at-
Philosophia Scientiæ, 17 (3), 2013, 5–23.
1. PratiScienS stands for “Rethinking Sciences from the Standpoint of Scientific
Practices”. The aim of the project is to develop a systematic analysis of the con-
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tended the conference in person, and creatively took part in the lively ex-
changes about his position. Initially, Harry was ‘only’ asked to introduce
the conference and to respond to the different talks, but as a result of these
exchanges, he was kind enough to give a spontaneous and very stimulating
extra-talk. We were, and remain, very grateful to Harry for the role he has
played in making the conference a success and in participating in bringing
about the present thematic issue. Although the thematic issue was inspired
by the original conference, its contributions are the result of a separate call
for papers.
The thematic issue begins and ends with two new contributions from
Collins. In the first, Collins introduces the core elements of his characteriza-
tion of tacit knowledge in TEK and reconsiders these elements in retrospect.
In the second, he concludes by reviewing the articles in the issue and addresses
the main questions raised by each of them.
We would also like to draw particular attention to a contribution of a spe-
cial type, co-authored by Collins and Arthur Reber. Reber is Broeklundian
Professor emeritus at Brooklyn College, and has conducted empirical psycho-
logical research into tacit knowledge acquisition for more than four decades.
In 1993, he published a book on tacit knowledge from the experimental point
of view, Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge: An essay on the cognitive
unconscious [Reber 1993]. This book was the reason that the editors invited
Reber to review one of the manuscripts. A by-product of the reviewing process
was that Collins and Reber started a correspondence about some aspects of
tacit knowledge, and came to realize they were entangled in a typical example
of a long-standing clash between different frames—they came to realize that
Collins’s sociological and Reber’s psychological perspectives on tacit knowledge
could be thought of as “incommensurable” in a Kuhnian sense. They then con-
ceived the idea to reconstruct their exchange, with its misunderstandings and
agreements about tacit knowledge, and put it on paper. The resulting article
goes beyond the scope of tacit knowledge: it has become a remarkable and
entertaining ‘inside description’ of a clash of paradigms, easily recognizable to
sequences of the so-called “practice turn” in the science studies and to investigate
philosophically significant issues about scientific practices. One of these issues is the
role of tacit aspects in the constitution of scientific results (understood in the broad
sense of result: theoretical claims and systems of claims, experimental facts, tech-
nological achievements, mathematical theorems, etc.). Other central questions are
the issue of how something acquires the status of a robust result in the empirical
and the formal sciences or how we should assess the contingency or inevitability of
robust scientific achievements. The project started in 2007 and is pursued by a small
interdisciplinary group of France-based historians, philosophers and sociologists of
science (where ‘science’ must be understood here including mathematics and logic
besides the empirical sciences). Beyond the core of the French-based researchers of
the PratiScienS group, other researchers from many different countries are associated
to the group. Besides Harry Collins, they include Hasok Chang, Karine Chemla,
Peter Galison, Thomas Nickles, Andrew Pickering, Claude Rosental, Jean-Paul van
Bendegem and William C. Wimsatt.
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anyone who has had similar experiences with a frame-shifting discussion. It
also offers some evidence that although the task is hard and success requires
willful effort and perseverance, incommensurability does not preclude the pos-
sibility of mutual understanding. As editors, we wish to congratulate Collins
& Reber on their success in surmounting the difficulties of the process and in
providing a living exemplar of how cross-paradigm conversations go; we are
delighted and grateful that Collins & Reber contributed this unexpected bonus
to our thematic issue.
In the remainder of this editorial introduction, we first situate the subject
of tacit knowledge in the landscape of the science studies; next we consider
Collins’s contribution to this subject; and finally, we sketch a brief overview
of the contents of the present thematic issue.
1 Tacit knowledge in the landscape of the
science studies
Skills and tacit aspects involved in scientific practices are a relatively re-
cent theme in philosophical, sociological and historical studies of science, and
Collins has played an important role in establishing the interest in this theme.
The origin of reflections about the nature of tacit knowledge and its modes
of intervention in human activities aiming at knowledge acquisition is com-
monly attributed to Michael Polanyi (see especially [Polanyi 1958, 1967]).
Often, Wittgenstein (in relation to rule-following) and Thomas Kuhn also
have been referred to, and rightly so, as providing important insights into
tacit knowledge and related epistemic issues ([Wittgenstein 1953, 89, 201];
[Kuhn 1970]; for more details see [Soler 2009, chap. IX]).
In the 1970s, oftentimes inspired by these early writings, scholars inter-
ested in science became increasingly convinced that tacit knowledge played
an important role in science. How did this happen? At the time, researchers,
especially in sociology of science, questioned the widespread belief that science
could be adequately described only by its explicit products such as published
theories and explicit justifications, and stressed the need to study “science in
the making” and scientific practices rather than scientific products. They car-
ried out detailed studies of ongoing experimental practices and claimed that
such an approach led to a more profound and realistic conception of science.2
As a spin-off of these practice-oriented tendencies, some researchers, among
whom perhaps most importantly Harry Collins (see in particular his pioneering
2. See in particular [Collins 1974, 1975], [Garfinkel 1967], [Knorr-Cetina 1979],
[Latour & Woolgar 1979], and for the early 1980s, [Garfinkel, Lynch & Livingston
1981], [Knorr-Cetina 1981], [Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay 1983], [Lynch 1982a,b]. In this
context, [Bloor 1976] is also worth mentionning, since his and Barry Barnes’s “strong
program” has been very influential in the social studies of science in practice, although
Bloor did not himself conduct detailed empirical studies.
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contributions [Collins 1974, 1975]), showed that the actual process of science
included many important tacit, unarticulated aspects that resisted any at-
tempt of explication. By doing so they boosted the interest in tacit knowledge
in science.
Subsequently, more and more sociologists of science, but also philosophers
and historians of science, sought to explore and characterize tacit “know-
how” and tacit “know-that” (a distinction first introduced by Gilbert Ryle
in [Ryle 1945-1946], which later became classical), the acquisition of tacit re-
sources, and their transmission and dissemination within larger social groups.
Additionally, but more rarely, they analyzed the ways in which the attribution
of tacit resources affects the constitution of scientific results and conclusions.3
Traditionally, tacit resources are almost always referred to in the literature
by the term “tacit knowledge”. In order to remain consistent with this common
usage, the present thematic issue is entitled “Tacit Knowledge in Science”.
However, we believe that the term “tacit knowledge” should be questioned,
because not every tacit resource relevant to science or knowledge production
is straightforwardly well-characterized as knowledge.
Admittedly, conceptions of knowledge vary—as is illustrated by some of the
contributions in this thematic issue. In TEK, Collins favors the “knowledge-
as-stuff” metaphor, according to which knowledge can be detached from the
human beings who might possess it, and can be considered “in itself”. Within
this framework, we may consider, for example, the knowledge corresponding to
“bike-riding” independently of the specific way in which human beings know
how to ride bikes. However, other authors favor different perspectives on
knowledge (see in particular Thornton’s and Reber’s articles in this issue).
According to these authors, tacit knowledge can only be analyzed in reference
to the nature of the process through which a task is humanly accomplished,
such as, for instance, the nature of the process through which human beings
successfully ride bikes. Perhaps in order to emphasize the latter perspective,
Polanyi preferred the expression “tacit knowing” to that of tacit knowledge.
Even if we put aside differences between conceptions of knowledge, how-
ever, some tacit elements commonly referred to as “tacit knowledge” still do
not straightforwardly qualify as knowledge—at least not without further dis-
cussion. Take for example the tacit presuppositions an analyst attributes to a
given scientist from the past in order to explain the behavior and position of
this scientist, when these presuppositions are false according to the present-
day science of the analyst: are these presuppositions tacit knowledge? Or take
3. Beside Collins’s publications mentioned in note 1 and the references given
note 2, here is a selection of works that deal with the tacit dimension of human
knowledge (human knowledge broadly understood: from basic, everyday cognitive
activities like linguistic or mnesic tasks, to very specialized theoretical and technical
scientific practices): [Chomsky 1990], [Davies 1989], [Dreyfus 2004], [Ferguson 1992],
[Lynch 1985, 1993, 2007], [MacKenzie & Spinardi 1995], [Pinch, Collins & Carbone
1996], [Reber 1993, 2002], [Searle 1995, 2001], [Soler 2009, chap. IX], [Soler 2011a,b],
[Stich 1978], [Turner 1994].
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some ordinarily-tacit values and norms that were once constitutive of past sci-
entific practices, such as the requirement “reject any force-at-a-distance and
throw it out of science”: are these norms tacit knowledge? Even if the answer
is affirmative for some conceptions of knowledge, the knowledge’s status surely
cannot be taken for granted from the outset. Consequently, the currently stan-
dard expression “tacit knowledge” is potentially misleading and confusing. It
would be preferable to start from an agnostic position, and adopt a more neu-
tral vocabulary that does not already commit us to a position on the epistemic
status of the elements that we treat as tacit.
From such a perspective, we could replace “tacit knowledge” with “tacit
resources”, “tacit aspects” or “tacit dimension”. As far as Collins’s three central
categories in TEK are concerned—Relational, Somatic and Collective Tacit
Knowledge—we could substitute the “K”, which stands for Knowledge in RTK,
STK and CTK, with an “X”, and remain agnostic about the relation between
X and knowledge.
2 Collins’s contributions to the topic of tacit
knowledge
Collins creatively and critically exploited the contributions of Polanyi,
Wittgenstein, Kuhn and others, and put them to work in his research on
science. He is one of those scholars who have helped us to improve our un-
derstanding of both the nature of tacit knowledge, and the epistemological
consequences of the involvement of tacit resources in scientific and technolog-
ical practices.
From his first publication devoted to the tacit dimension (his now clas-
sical paper on the TEA-laser [Collins 1974]) onwards, via his famous book
Changing Order [Collins 1985], and many other publications, culminating in
TEK [Collins 2010], Collins has developed diverse and helpful analytical tools,
as well as insightful, although often controversial, theses related to tacit knowl-
edge. Let us briefly review a selection of these tools and theses.
2.1 Analytical tools for a finer grasp of tacit
knowledge
2.1.1 Types of tacit knowledge
Collins introduced multiple categories that help to distinguish various types
of tacit knowledge and to understand the relations among them.
In [Collins 2001a], nearly a decade before the publication of TEK, Collins
proposed his first useful classification of tacit knowledge, which was com-
posed of five categories: (i) “concealed knowledge” (such as knowledge that
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is kept secret); (ii) “ostensive knowledge” (such as knowledge that is transmit-
ted by pointing); (iii) “mismatched saliences” (such as knowledge that is not
expressed because the knower does not realize that it needs to be revealed to
a recipient); (iv) “unrecognized knowledge” (knowledge that is actually used
but not expressed and even not known to be possessed by the user); (v) “un-
cognized/uncognizable knowledge” (knowledge that is not articulated and not
explicable in a given stage of human history, and that is perhaps humanly
impossible to explicate).
In TEK, Collins introduces three new categories of higher-order, RTK,
STK, and CTK, and explains their relations to the five older 2001 categories.
In particular, the first four types of tacit knowledge he introduced in 2001
become different sub-types of Relational Tacit Knowledge in TEK.
The new three-fold mapping of tacit knowledge constitutes the core of the
analytical tools provided by Collins in TEK—even if, as we will see below, at
the end of section 3.2., Collins does not conceive the mapping only as a set of
useful tools, but also as an ontological division of the realm of tacit knowledge
into three altogether exhaustive kinds. In TEK, each of the three kinds of tacit
knowledge is classified according to the reason why the knowledge K involved
resists explication, and the three kinds are ordered according to the force of the
resistance to explication offered by the corresponding kind of K. Relational
or weak tacit knowledge (RTK) is knowledge that: (i) is explicable today
(i.e., could be explicated without fundamental problem, offers no essential
resistance to explication: hence the “weak”); and (ii) remains however tacit
in some particular situations, for contingent reasons that have to do with
the relations between people or groups of people (hence the “Relational”).
Collective or strong tacit knowledge (CTK) corresponds to knowledge that
possesses the three following features: (i) it is required to act relevantly and
creatively in a certain collective (hence the “Collective”); (ii) it is presently
inexplicable because of its collective character ; (iii) we cannot see today how
it could be explicated in any foreseeable future (hence the “strong”). Somatic
or medium tacit knowledge (STK) is positioned in between. It corresponds to
somatic skills defined by the three following features: (i) they are difficult to
explicate because they involve the body ; (ii) as a consequence of this particular
kind of difficulty, they remain, as a matter of fact in the present stage of
scientific development, inexplicable; (iii) they could nevertheless, assuming
further developments in scientific knowledge and technology, be explicated
(hence the “medium”), but only in certain ways—ways corresponding to what
Collins calls senses (3) and (4) of explication.
Mentioning Collins’s senses (3) and (4) of explication leads us to another
distinction developed in TEK, which plays an important role in several papers
of this thematic issue: the distinction between four different possible meanings
of “explicable” [TEK, 81]. This distinction proves to be a source of difficulties
for some of Collins’s readers. Or so is the conclusion of the editors, based on
their interpretation of several articles submitted to the call for papers for this
thematic issue.
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2.1.2 Four different meanings of “explicable”
According to Collins, tacit knowledge becomes explicit by the mediation
of “strings”. Strings are physical patterns without intrinsic meaning, like
the material side of a written word or of an uttered sentence. More
broadly put, strings may be the physical substrate of any meaningful human
interpretation—that is, almost any material thing.
There are four ways in which the manipulation of strings can lead to the
explication of some knowledge K, which is not explicated. This gives four
senses of “explicable”: (1) “explicable by elaboration”: “a longer string affords
meaning when a short one does not”; (2) “explicable by transformation”: “a
physical transformation of strings enhances their causal effect and affordance”;
(3) “explicable by mechanization”: “a string is transformed into mechanical
causes and effects that mimic human action”; and (4) “explicable by expla-
nation”: “mechanical causes and effects are transformed into strings called
scientific explanations” [TEK, 81]. Senses (1) and (2) are related to the most
widespread uses of “explicable” and “explicit”. Roughly speaking, to explicate
in these senses is to capture, in ordinary language, what is tacit for an inter-
locutor, by saying more or saying it differently. By contrast, senses (3) and (4)
depart from common usages. To explicate in sense (4) is to develop a scientific
explanation of some performance or knowledge K. It might be, for example,
a scientific explanation of “riding a bike” in terms of the curve that should be
taken to compensate for a given angle of imbalance [TEK, 101]. To explicate
in sense (3) is to succeed in building a machine that is able to realize some
K, such as, for example, a robot able to ride a bike as well as humans do—
that is, able to go from a point A to a point B without falling—even though
for the same performance, the underlying robotic processes differ from those
of humans. We think it is important to examine the counterintuitive impli-
cations related to Collins’s senses (3) and (4) of explication. Some of these
implications are considered in the contributions to the present thematic issue
(see notably those by Thornton and Soler-Zwart).
Other interesting conceptual distinctions are introduced in TEK in relation
to RTK, STK and CTK. To close our selection, we would like to mention
the analysis proposed by Collins of eight different “types of cannot” [TEK,
90]. Differentiations of these types were urgently needed, and are considerably
clarifying, when compared to crude classical definitions of tacit knowledge as
knowledge that cannot be explicated.
Let us turn to the epistemological consequences of the inevitable involve-
ment of tacit resources in scientific and technological practices.
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2.2 Epistemological implications related to tacit
knowledge
2.2.1 Delays, failures and losses in knowledge transmission
A first, no longer very controversial but still important implication of Collins’s
earlier case studies, is that tacit knowledge can be responsible for impediments,
delays or even failures, in the transmission of the experimental or technical pro-
tocols. When a scientist S2 attempts to follow protocols set out by another
scientist S1 for re-producing experimental facts or technical objects that S1
claims to have successfully produced, S2 might fail because S2 does not succeed
in acquiring the tacit knowledge possessed by S1. A successful replication is
not guaranteed by the conservation of written protocols and public reports, be-
cause the tacit knowledge (especially the tacit know-how) is never completely
captured by such explicit means. This raises the risk of irreversible losses of
knowledge. Limiting such risk requires timely and costly maintenance poli-
cies and activities—such as uninterrupted transmission of the specific human
know-how from experts to apprentices, or the development, where possible, of
mechanical or ‘turnkey’ methods for bypassing human tacit knowledge.
2.2.2 Tacit knowledge and the experimenter’s regress
A second, crucial and highly controversial thesis is Collins’s famous thesis of
the experimenter’s regress. In Collins’s words:
To know whether you have built a good gravitational wave detec-
tor, you should try it and see if it works properly. But to know
what “works properly” means you have to know what it should see.
But to know what it should see, you have to know what gravi-
tational waves look like. But to know what gravitational waves
look like, you have to build a good gravitational wave detector
and look at them. But to know whether you have built a good
gravitational wave detector, you should try it and see if it works
properly. And so on! [Collins 2004, 126]
The experimenter’s regress locates tacit knowledge at the level of the
proper working of the instrumental device (in the above quotation, the
gravitational-wave detector). When an experimental controversy arises, any
experimental conclusion advocated by a given team can be contested by
claiming that the competing experimenters lacked the crucial tacit knowledge
needed to carry out the experiment successfully.
2.2.3 Under-determinations in tacit knowledge attribution
and variable ideas about success
The problems with replication and the experimenter’s regress might be con-
sidered to be a pragmatic and elaborated version of the Duhem-Quine thesis
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about the under-determination of theories by empirical evidence. Accordingly,
tacit aspects introduce an additional source of indeterminacy in science [Soler
2011b]. In a given historical scientific controversy, in principle, at least two
interpretations are possible, and alternative interpretations actually are some-
times endorsed by rival teams: either the experimenters do indeed possess
some tacit knowledge and their experimental conclusions are well-grounded;
or they do not possess the required tacit knowledge and their experimental
conclusions must be dismissed as methodologically faulty. But how do we
know if some subjects indeed possess tacit knowledge, and who decides in case
of disagreements between the actors?
The experimenters’ regress thesis draws our attention to the empirical con-
ditions through which we usually attribute tacit knowledge to actors, whether
or not they are scientists. Namely: we notice that some people or groups of
people, ourselves possibly included, are able to perform valued tasks repeat-
edly whereas others are not able to do so; we notice that they are able to
perform these tasks without telling how they do so, and that many aspects of
their successful actions are hard or even impossible to express (when we ask
the actors to explicate them or when we try to articulate them ourselves); we
conclude that these people have resources at their disposal that others lack
and, if we are ready to identify the result of their actions as a true success, we
are ready to consider the possessed resources as tacit knowledge.
Such an attribution of tacit knowledge is not too problematic when we are
dealing with already institutionalized and socially stabilized kinds of action,
such as bike riding, normal science and the like. In these cases, what “success”
means is relatively clear; individuals or groups by and large agree about what
counts as a success and what counts as a failure. But the more we deal with
pioneering, creative, open, non-stabilized and non-consensual practices—such
as when scientists attempt to investigate new phenomena by means of poorly-
mastered experimental devices, or during periods of scientific revolution, or
when avant-gardist artists challenge established conventions, and so forth—
the more the meaning of success becomes an open-ended and controversial
matter. In such pioneering situations, the people involved entertain different
(often tacit) intuitions about success and how to recognize it; the parties
compete to impose their own (often tacit) values and to have them recognized
as the appropriate ones. Two competing groups of people operating with
heterogeneous intuitions about success are unlikely to attribute the status of
knowledge to the same tacit resources. A tacit resource valued as knowledge
by some, is likely to be dismissed by others as a tacit prejudice.
In short, tacit knowledge identification and attribution is strongly related
to ideas about success, and ideas about success might vary between societies,
among individuals, and from one context to another. Among other sources
of under-determination, ‘subjective’ and ‘social’ sources can be suspected to
play a role in attributions of tacit knowledge. Examples of such attributions
are the tendency of parents to overvalue the capacities of their children, and
hence to attribute tacit knowledge to them all too easily; or the hegemonic
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tendencies of a given community to claim that they are the sole possessors of
the inexpressible knowledge required to achieve certain socially valued aims.
Trevor Pinch and Michael Lynch give examples in their contributions.
2.2.4 The ontological status of tacit knowledge
Reflections such as those we have just discussed lead us to ask questions about
the ontological status of tacit knowledge. Is tacit knowledge real? Or, is tacit
knowledge relative and inextricably attached to some (collective or individual)
subject?
Collins was one of the first scholars to draw our attention to the problem-
atic character of the epistemic status of tacit knowledge, when he identified
the experimenters’ regress and the under-determinations that go with it. In
TEK, however, Collins does not take experimenter’s regress into account and
leaves aside its implications. Let us recap Collins’s ontological position in
TEK: in that book Collins offers a systematic conceptual analysis of tacit and
explicit knowledge, from which follows a new three-fold classification of tacit
knowledge, which Collins endows with an empirical and ontological status.
RTK, STK and CTK are not just three useful tools to order a ‘hypothetical
something’ called “tacit knowledge”. No, for Collins tacit knowledge is real
knowledge, and RTK, STK and CTK name three different existing kinds of
tacit knowledge. In brief, RTK, STK and CTK cut the realm of tacit knowl-
edge at its joints. Thus in TEK, Collins treats tacit knowledge as if it is
unproblematically real; he reasons as though the success, failure, or relevancy
of human actions— which work as criteria for tacit knowledge attributions—
are uncontroversial and taken for granted; as though knowledge is some sort
of real “stuff”, isolable as such and independent of any specified subject.
The different attitude that Collins takes toward tacit knowledge in TEK, as
compared with his earlier work, has puzzled some readers (see notably Pinch’s
and Lynch’s contributions to this thematic issue). In response to his critics,
Collins attempts to clarify the relation between the stance adopted in TEK
and that adopted in his earlier works, and explains the position endorsed in
TEK as a shift of attention.
3 Fundamental background features of
Collins’s worldview
Collins’s recent realist approach and three-fold ontological mapping of tacit
knowledge operates within a particular worldview. To conclude our presenta-
tion of Collins’s perspective on tacit knowledge, we shall introduce some core
elements of this worldview.
According to Collins, reality is made of two radically different kinds of be-
ings and processes. On one side, there are interpretative beings and processes,
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that is, beings that possess language, produce meaning, have culture, use sym-
bolic entities and make translations between them. On the other side, we have
beings and processes that do not interpret—in Collins’s terminology they are
determined by strings and transformations of strings: cause-effect processes,
mechanical transformations, nature as opposed to culture, inert things as op-
posed to meaningful entities. This dual perspective is at the heart of Collins’s
crucial and pivotal “transformation-translation” thesis [TEK, 25ff.].
Only human beings are interpretative beings—or more exactly human-like
beings, since, as Collins insists, where to draw the dividing line exactly is
unimportant: the essential point is the existence of the ontological divide.
Human-like beings are unique in their interpretative activities. Moreover, hu-
man beings are social beings in an essential sense [TEK, 116]. Consequently,
all aspects that are on the side of interpretative realities, such as language,
meaning, culture, translation and so on, are social realities. They would not
exist in the absence of a collectivity—a collectivity whose members present cer-
tain kinds of somatic and non-somatic affordances that enable interpretative
activities. As a true collectivist, Collins claims that all aspects of interpre-
tative realities are properties of collectives, and that they cannot be reduced
to individuals or to interactions between individuals. Individuals acquire lan-
guage, meaning, and culture, as well as the ability to translate and interpret
creatively and relevantly, by means of their immersion in society through a
mysterious “socialization process”.
Human-social beings and human societies are characterized by variability,
flexibility, openness and unpredictable processes, or in Collins’s concepts, by
“polimorphic actions” [Collins & Kusch 1995, 1998]: different members of a
given society, as well as one and the same individual at different moments, act
flexibly, creatively and relevantly according to the social contexts; societies
themselves, and the tacit social rules that characterize them, differ from place
to place and change rapidly through time.
In contrast, non-human, or non-human-like beings and groups of such
beings—animal species, inert “natural kinds”, etc.—are characterized by rela-
tively uniform, fixed, rigid, predetermined (i.e., mechanical) behaviors. Such
behaviors do not vary from one member of the species to the others—neither
in a given period of history, nor through time: dogs or stones do not be-
have today in an essentially different way than they behaved yesterday and
will behave tomorrow. In Collins’s terminology, such behaviors correspond to
“mimeomorphic actions”. Non-human-like beings do not adapt their way of
behaving flexibly throughout the process of their immersion into the group
they belong to.
This ontological duality between interpretative-translational and non-
interpretative-mechanical realities is highly controversial, and far from being
an easy matter. It is reminiscent of Descartes’ dualism, which still preoccu-
pies contemporary debates on the relations between the natural and the social
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sciences. In spite of its intricacies, Collins manages to propose his dualist
position in a clear and bold way.
4 Contents of the special issue
Beyond a common interest in tacit knowledge, the authors of articles in this
thematic issue have different backgrounds, stemming from various research
traditions, and displaying a variety of professional interests. Three of them,
Trevor Pinch, Michael Lynch and Stephen Turner are well-established so-
ciologists of science and technology. The other contributing scholars, Tim
Thornton, Léna Soler and Sjoerd Zwart, have backgrounds in philosophy. Tim
Thornton is a Wittgenstein specialist; Léna Soler has been trained in the tradi-
tion of historical philosophy of science (more specifically philosophy of physics);
and Sjoerd Zwart’s main area of interest is the analytical philosophy of tech-
nology. As has already been mentioned in section 1, the author of the final
critical article, Arthur Reber, won his spurs in empirical psychology. The dif-
ferences in background of the authors guarantee contrasting ways of framing
on Collins’s analyses of tacit knowledge, and this alone already enhances the
interest of the present thematic issue.
Let us turn to the structure of this issue. The first critical contribution is
written by Trevor Pinch, who once was a student of Collins and has collabo-
rated with him for decades [Collins & Pinch 1979, 1982, 1993, 1998], [Pinch,
Collins & Carbone 1996]. Pinch is therefore very well suited to place the treat-
ment of tacit knowledge in TEK in the context of the rest of Collins’s work. By
so doing, he discusses a tension “between the realism underlying his [Collins’s]
notion of ‘tacit knowledge’ and the constructivism underlying his [...] ‘exper-
imenters’ regress’ ”. In relation to this challenge, Pinch addresses—as Lynch
and Turner also do—the question of the ontological status of tacit knowledge
and the empirical criteria according to which we may decide that someone has
the tacit knowledge in question.
While Pinch focuses on Collective Tacit Knowledge, and Lynch concen-
trates on Relational Tacit Knowledge, both authors ask the same kind of
question: should we take literally Collins’s “knowledge-as-stuff” metaphor and
conclude that some subject possesses tacit knowledge as though it is some
kind of “stuff”? Or should we treat tacit knowledge as an “actors’ category”
used in relation to various aims, for example, to reinforce a cultural iden-
tity, secure the autonomy of science, enhance the status of a profession, or
protect labor practices from managerial surveillance and control? Note that
if, as the editors claim (see section 3.2), the attribution of tacit knowledge
is under-determined, the two options are always possible with respect to the
interpretation of a given situation (i.e., the analyst can either conclude that
some real tacit knowledge is indeed possessed by the actors, or that the pos-
session of tacit knowledge is claimed by the actors in order to achieve certain
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aims); moreover, the two interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive. Both Pinch and Lynch seem more sympathetic to the second option.
In particular Lynch, as a student of Harold Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology in
sociology, and as a well-known ethnographer of laboratory practices [Lynch &
Sharrock 2010], pursues the second interpretation and suggests
that an empirical sociological alternative [to developing a typol-
ogy of tacit knowledge] is to investigate pragmatic and polemical
uses of the tacit/explicit distinction in particular circumstances
of action and conflict.
The next article is written by Stephen Turner. In his 1994 book, The
Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge, and Presuppositions
[Turner 1994], Turner argues that the notion of practice conceived as a tacit
stuff “shared” by a group, is beset by difficulties and fails to serve its purpose.
In the present thematic issue, Turner criticizes Collins’s notions of “collectiv-
ity” and “collective” along the lines he set out in his 1994 book and in his 2011
review of TEK [Turner 2011]. Like Pinch, Turner concentrates on Collective
Tacit Knowledge, but his aim is different. It is to examine the crucial idea be-
hind the notion underlying Collins’s treatment of tacit knowledge, namely, the
notion of “collective” upon which Collins has built his category of Collective
Tacit Knowledge. Turner distinguishes between the social and the collective.
Whereas the former explains society using bottom-up explanations in terms
of processes occurring between individuals, so that the social is reducible to
relations among individuals, past and present, the latter is more ontologi-
cally laden. Like “Durkheim’s sociologization of Kant” it implies “collective,
shared, psychological” irreducible contents, that are “necessary to account for
social life.” Turner offers an analysis of the specific assets and difficulties of
each approach, which he calls a “Scorecard”. The resulting “score” should,
according to Turner, leave us unconvinced that “Collective Tacit Knowledge
fills an explanatory need in a simple, or single cause, and in this sense ‘par-
simonious’ way”. Turner arrives at this conclusion following an interesting
line of thought. He starts with transcendental arguments of the kind “con-
ditions for the possibility of” used by Kant and the neo-Kantians, and sub-
sequently focuses on the long tradition of transcendental reasoning in which
causal claims are deduced from transcendental arguments. He judges the lat-
ter to be vague and elaborates on two reasons for this vagueness: the problems
of transmission and under-determination. This brings him to question—like
Pinch and Lynch but via a different route—the ‘realist status’ of tacit knowl-
edge. When one reconstructs a position like ‘endorsing some tacit presuppo-
sition’, is this presupposition actually there, ‘in the head’ of some individuals
or somewhere in the collective? Turner’s answer is negative, and he proposes
an alternative interpretation.
The next two contributions come from scholars who were trained as
philosophers, but in different traditions. In his paper, Thornton—who is him-
self the co-author of a recent book entitled Tacit Knowledge [Gascoigne &
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Thornton 2012]—criticizes Collins’s notion of “string” in relation to the issue
of tacit knowledge. The culprit of Collins’s problematic use of strings is, ac-
cording to Thornton, the way Collins has responded to (and misunderstood)
Wittgenstein’s rules regress. Both Thornton’s and Soler-Zwart’s papers con-
sider Collins’s four senses of “explicable” and ask the question of the relation
between explicable in senses (1) or (2) on the one hand, and explicable in senses
(3) or (4) on the other hand (see section 3.1 above). Thornton describes the
success of the explication in senses (3) and (4) at a given time as an “action
at a distance” with respect to explication in senses (1) and (2). According to
his account, mechanization and scientific explanation of some knowledge K
by some engineer or scientist, for example the construction of a robot able to
ride a bike, would make the knowledge of people who know how to ride bike
explicit “at a distance”. Yet, the people in question need not know anything
about what the scientist or engineer has achieved, and remain as incapable
as before of explicating how they ride a bike. Soler & Zwart in their article
instead urge that we should always specify the sense in which some knowl-
edge K has been explicated instead of just saying that K has been explicated
‘tout court ’. The attributions “explicit” and “explicable” should always carry
an index that specifies which of Collins’s four senses is meant. This would
be sufficient to avoid confusion and the impression of counterintuitive conse-
quences such as the one put forward by Thornton under the telling expression
of “action-at-a-distance”.4
The main aim of Soler & Zwart is to elaborate and expand upon Collins’s
tacit knowledge framework. The authors first argue that the identity of the
RTK category and, as a corollary, what unifies its sub-cases, and makes them
pertain to one and the same category, is not well-characterized in TEK. They
suggest that a better characterization of RTK would be knowledge ‘not expli-
cated for reasons that are contingent with respect to the nature of K’, rather
than ‘not explicated for relational reasons’. According to this suggestion, RTK
is knowledge that is explicated or not for contingent reasons; thus in partic-
ular, it can be explicated or not by one and the same subject depending on
the circumstances; or it can be explicable for one subject and not the other.
Taking these possibilities into account, Soler & Zwart recommend that the
terms “explicit”, “tacit” or “explicable” should always be accompanied by the
specification for whom and when. This would help to avoid confusions or mis-
understandings when using Collins’s distinctions. Moreover, the authors iden-
tify an ambiguity in the interpretation of RTK, STK, and CTK, and indicate
how to avoid the related possible confusion. Using some new notations, they
explicitly formulate a profound asymmetry between RTK on the one hand,
and STK/CTK on the other, and introduce some possible sub-types of RTK.
Finally, they consider dynamical aspects of Collins’s framework, and discuss
4. Collins (private communication, 30 April 2013) agrees with Soler & Zwart but
also thinks that the idea of explication at a distance is illuminating.
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the possibility—not considered by Collins—of transformations over time of
STK to RTK and CTK to RTK.
The penultimate contribution of the thematic issue, preceding Collins’s
response to the articles, is the ‘Collins-Reber piece’, the specific character and
originality of which have already been stressed in section 1. To some extent,
this piece is a report of a journey in which two well-established scholars who
have studied tacit knowledge for decades, discuss that topic from their different
disciplines and individual perspectives. It beautifully illustrates the difficulties
scientists encounter when they try to understand each other’s intentions, use
of terms, meaning of concepts, and main research questions on by and large
the same subject. Aside from the particular topic of tacit knowledge, we
recommend this article to anyone who is interested in framing, paradigms and
incommensurability. Combining imagery from two articles of this thematic
issue, we can say that Collins and Reber, after having passed for decades like
“ships in the night”, finally came to see each other at the horizon, found a way
to come closer without crashing, and finally navigated side by side, on the
“wide river of tacit knowledge with islands of explicit knowledge popping up
here and there and slowly developing into more extensive territories”.5
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